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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to identify the major determinants of tax havens in the actual economic context. The 
development of tax havens was favored by some factors at macroeconomic level, but also by tax noncompliance behavior 
of individuals who are seeking different ways to avoid taxation. Based on a logistic regression this study reveals the most 
important factors that favor a country’s tax haven status. The main finding of this approach is that low taxation is not 
enough for a country to be a tax haven. Despite the fact that the corporate tax rate is indeed significant according to the 
model, the percentage of services in GDP proves to be the most prominent variable, and only the countries which have an 
important part of their GDP made up of services are likely to acquire tax haven status. Since offshore finance is one of the 
main pillars on which tax havens lie down, the importance of the services sector comes as no surprise. Using the logit 
model, each country’s tax haven status is determined. 
 
© 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer review under responsibility of Emerging 
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1. Introduction 
Tax haven status involves combining more favorable conditions in order to create that climate of great 
economic, fiscal, political and infrastructure necessary for the development of tax avoidance tasks using various 
tools and mechanisms such as offshore companies. 
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According to classical definitions, a tax haven is a country which has a very low taxation or even no taxation 
at all. However, tax havens are not all about low or lack of taxation. They are also characterized by high levels 
of secrecy and the availability of a strong network of financial services that allows users sophisticated strategies 
for achieving their goals. 
From a historical perspective tax havens have a continuously and complex evolution along the time.  Gordon 
Report identifies one of the first "ancestors" of modern tax havens and implicitly tax evasion: Ancient Greece. 
In Athens, in order to avoid a custom duty in value of 2% applied by the city on imports and exports of goods, 
merchants were using nearby islands for storing their goods, which were then illegally introduced in the city 
(Gordon, 1981: 21). 
Tax havens and money laundering have a long history behind, having as users pirates who acted in the 
Atlantic Ocean in the seventeenth century. They used to go in certain place, and even to moneylenders that 
represent for them a way of hiding wealth from plundering merchant ships (Nandra, 2008: 131). 
A defining moment for the evolution of tax havens is when the legislation regarding limited liability 
companies was adopted in England and in its colonies in the nineteenth century. With the emergence of this 
type of company the two types of taxes that exist nowadays were differentiated: profit tax in the case of 
MXULGLFDOSHUVRQVDQGLQFRPHWD[IRUWKHSK\VLFDOSHUVRQV0ăQăLOă 
The European countries economies were in a bad state after the end of the First World War and funds were 
desperately needed in order to recover. In consequence, the vast majority of them choose to highly increase 
their level of taxes. Many of the investors were not at all pleased by this situation and therefore them chosen to 
move their money in Switzerland which was neutral and used to be a financial haven for investors even before 
this event. Furthermore, Switzerland significantly lowered its level of taxation.   
One of the characteristics of tax haven legislation is the quick company registration technique that was used 
for the first time in New Jersey Delaware around 1880 by the governor of New Jersey. In that time, considering 
the fact that other U.S. states’ legislation was quite restrictive in terms of recording companies, New Jersey 
attracted a large number of corporations who were interested in its permissive legislation regarding company 
registration. In addition, Delaware also started to make use of this technique. So it seems that one of the first 
techniques used by tax havens was established in these two states. The European states also began to follow 
their example. It is the case of some Swiss cantons that brought this technique in Europe and started using it 
(Palan, 2009). 
The idea of the “virtual” residence was patented by the British Court when there were firms that were 
registered in Britain even if they didn’t have any form of activity there and as a consequence of the non-
residence they were not subject to taxation. This technique was later copied by Bermuda and Bahamas and 
improved by Cayman Islands (Palan, 2009). 
The point when Switzerland highly increased its level of banking secrecy in 1934 by placing the obligation 
of keeping this secret under the protection of criminal law is another important moment  for the historical 
evolution of tax havens. The punishment was the imprisonment for any act of disclosure of information to some 
authorities regarding customer bank accounts (Buzan, 2011:14-15). 
So, as it can be widely observed the legal premises on which modern tax havens later developed are: laws in 
Delaware and New Jersey on quick registration companies, the UK laws related to tax residency and the Swiss 
law that establishes the banking secrecy (Buzan, 2011: 15). 
States that began to enact a legislation that would favor the development of the necessary conditions of 
becoming a tax haven started doing this by being aware of all the advantages that would accompany it only 
after the Second World War (Buzan, 2011: 12).  
Lately tax havens have been the cause of a great international concern while becoming the target of 
numerous attacks from various institutions and individuals. This is a normal reaction taking into account the 
history of economic crimes involving financial havens and the accusations of them eroding other countries’ tax 
base. Some examples of financial crimes conducted through tax havens are the following: Panama has served as 
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a center for cleaning Chicago mafia’s funds, having as intermediary the cardinal Paul Marcinkus who involved 
several offshore financial institutions from Vatican in illegal business. Another case that raises big question 
marks about the way in which multinationals make business is the case of Enron, whose collapse was highly 
publicized and also involved the dissolution of Arthur Andersen, one of the “Big Five” accounting firms 
providing services to large corporations. Appearing as a result of the merger between Houston Natural Gas and 
InterNorth the company had no more and no less than 881 offshore branches and companies from which 692 
were registered in Cayman Islands and others in Turks and Caicos, Mauritius, Bermuda, Luxembourg, Nevada 
DQG'HODZDUH0ăQăLOă- 181). 
For any new investments, Enron used three companies that were registered in Cayman Islands. Two 
companies owned a third one which was registered as the actual holder investment. In the case of liquidation or 
sale of investment Enron was subject to a favorable tax treatment in the U.S. This is just one of the schemes 
used by Enron, which turned from the seventh U.S. company taking into accounts its size, into a symbol of 
IUDXG$Q\ZD\ WKH VFKHPHVXVHGKDYHEHHQGHFODUHG LOOHJDOE\6(&0ăQăLOă%RWK&OLQWRQDQG
George Bush expressed their opposition to tax havens says Palan (2009). Tax havens have come under scrutiny 
RILQVWLWXWLRQVOLNH*,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RQHtary Fund, Financial Stability Board and OECD and last but not least 
the European Union’s fight against tax havens ought to be mentioned.  
In this respect the action plan issued by the European Commission in 2012 is of high relevance. The plan 
was issued in order to respond more effectively against evasion and tax fraud in the EU and one of the 
recommendations includes adopting a strong position of the EU against tax havens, one that is stronger than 
international current measures. In the communication is stated that “tax havens compete unfairly and make it 
difficult for 'non' tax havens to collect a fair amount of taxation from their residents” while mentioning in the 
same time that “stepping up the fight against tax fraud and evasion is not only an issue of revenue, but also of 
fairness”.  
Consequently, tax havens attract extensive foreign investment, and have registered substantial economic 
growth over the past 25 years. (Dharmapala and Hines 2006) The question would then be: why do not all non-
haven countries modify their taxation in order to attract foreign money? The answer is because they cannot 
afford to become tax havens. Beyond low taxation, the profile of a tax haven can be summarized as follows: 
well-governed, small country, with low population enjoying a high GDP per capita and where services have a 
very large share in GDP. 
According to a report published by the International Monetary Fund in 2008, there are 46 confirmed tax 
havens in the world today. The GDP per capita in almost all of these countries is higher than the world average, 
ZKLOH WKHPHDQ RI VHUYLFHV DV SHUFHQWDJH RI*'3 LV DSSUR[LPDWHO\  FRPSDUHG WR ZKLFK LV WKH
world average excluding tax havens. Generally, tax havens have below 1 million inhabitants and are not 
members of any international organization. In order to determine the significant factors determining the tax 
haven status statistical data and econometric models will be used. 
2. Methodology and results 
The starting point of this study was the work of Dharmapala, Dhammika and Hines, James R., Which 
countries become tax havens? (2006). The quality of a country’s governance is identified as being the core 
factor determining which countries become tax havens. Using evidence from US multinationals, the authors 
show that well-governed countries tend to attract more foreign direct investment than countries with a poor 
quality of governance, considering the same level of taxation in both types of countries. 
The novelty of this study is given by the fact that, in our vision, several other variables with a much stronger 
impact on the tax haven status can be identified, the percentage of services in GDP, the tax rate for offshore 
companies and the level of GDP/capita being among these variables. Starting from these ideas, we try to prove 
the validity of these variables in order to offer a completely new perspective on the tax haven status.  
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Hansen and Kessler (2001) explain the existence and characteristics of tax havens through a combined 
approach involving both political and geographical factors. They investigated whether the geography of a 
country affects its pattern of taxation. According to the authors, tax havens and tax hells have emerged because 
of the differences in countries’ surface. The most important conclusion of this study is that small countries 
generally charge lower taxes than larger ones. 
Slemrod and Wilson (2009) develop a framework in which tax havens are dependent on the revenues of 
other countries. They also showed that smaller countries usually choose to become tax havens. In addition, 
Slemrod and Wilson also concluded that the incentive to engage in tax haven operations rises with capital 
income tax rates, and governments respond to this lost revenue by relying more on other sources of revenue 
(taxes on wage income in their model) and also by cutting public expenditures.   
The econometric model is based on data provided by World Bank and other few data bases (as can be seen 
in Table 1) for all the countries. We realize for testing our determinants a cross-section regression in a probit 
model. 
Table 1. Description of the variables used to explain the tax haven status 
Symbol Variable Description of the variable Source 
LN_GDPCAP_PPP GDP/capita* Measured in terms of Purchasing Power 
Parity, as of 2010. 
Global Finance Magazine; CIA 
World fact book 
GOVERNANCE_INDE
X 
Governance index It is a variable taking values in the 
interval (-2.5; 2.5), a variable with 
normal distribution of mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1. The values are for 
2009. 
The work of Daniel Kaufmann, 
Aart Kraay and Massimo 
Mastruzzi from the World Bank 
Institute. 
LN_POPULATION_201
1 
Population* The number of inhabitants, using 
estimates for July 2011. 
CIA World fact book 
PERC_OF_SERVICES_
IN_GDP 
Percentage of 
services in GDP 
The share of services in a country’s 
GDP, figures for 2010. 
Global Finance Magazine 
TAX_RATE_OFFSHOR
E_COMP 
Corporate tax rate 
for offshore 
companies 
The rate used for computing the tax due 
on profit by foreign companies, as of 
January 2011. 
Deloitte Report, 2011 
LN_AREA_SQ_KM Area* The surface of the country, expressed in 
square kilometres 
CIA World fact book 
ISLAND Island It takes the value 1 if the country is an 
island, and 0 otherwise 
CIA World fact book 
ENGLISH_OFF_LANG
UAGE 
English as official 
language 
It takes the value 1 if English is one of 
the official languages in a certain 
jurisdiction, and 0 otherwise 
CEPII database 
FORMER_BRITISH_C
OLONY 
Former British 
colony 
It takes the value 1 if the country has a 
British colonial past and 0 otherwise. 
CEPII database 
The dependent variable in the analysis is the Tax haven status. This is a dummy variable, which can take 
two values: 1 if the country is a tax haven and 0 if the country is not a tax haven. There are several opinions 
and debates regarding the tax haven status of some countries or jurisdictions, and therefore there are several 
lists of tax havens. For this analysis, we use the most recent list, which is the one published in the IMF Report 
from 2008, which identifies a number of 46 tax haven jurisdictions (see Appendix 1). The total number of 
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countries which constitute the regression sample and for which all of the above mentioned variables were 
gathered, is 214, out of which 46 are tax havens. 
Table 2. Summary of the main descriptive statistics 
Non-haven countries Tax havens 
Variable Mean Variance St. deviation Mean Variance St. deviation 
Log of GDP/capita  1.64 1.28 9.85 0.85 0.92 
Governance index -0.19 0.81 0.90  0.40 0.63 
Log of population 15.96 3.51  11.94   
Percentage of services in 
GDP 
0.55 0.02 0.15  0.02 0.14 
Corp. tax rate for offshore 
companies 
0.26 0.01 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.13 
Log of area 11.96 4.51 2.12 6.32 5.06 2.25 
Island 0.18 0.15 0.39  0.20 0.45 
English as official 
language 
0.22  0.41  0.23 0.48 
Former British colony 0.2 0.20 0.45  0.20 0.45 
The statistics summarized Table 2 come to support the typical tax haven profile: a small country not only in 
terms of area, but also in terms of population, with a high GDP/capita and where the services sector has an 
extensive contribution to the country’s GDP. 
 Fig. 1 charts the average GDP/capita in non-havens as a horizontal line against which are plotted the values 
for this indicator in tax havens. More than half of the tax haven jurisdictions have an elevated level of 
GDP/capita in terms of purchasing power parity. In these countries, per-capita welfare is high enough to allow 
for smaller government revenues by means of cutting corporate tax rates for offshore companies. Fig. 2 plots 
the average share of services in the GDP of non-haven countries, which according to Table 2 is 55%. With very 
few exceptions, all tax havens have a share of services in GDP which is above the average for the other 
countries. 
Fig. 1. Comparison GDP/capita in tax havens and the average GDP/capita in non-havens 
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According to a ranking prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, and available on its website, 11 out of 
the 20 countries with the highest level of GDP/capita (based on 2010 estimates) are tax havens. Liechtenstein 
ranks second only behind Qatar, and is therefore the tax haven which has the largest per-capita welfare. 
Fig. 2. Percentage of services in GDP in tax havens compared to the average for non-havens 
The economy of tax havens is focused heavily on the services sector, given that the majority of these 
countries are poorly endowed with natural resources. This lack of resources prevents them from relying on 
industry or agriculture, for instance, in order to sustain their economic growth. (Dharmapala 2008, citing 
estimates from the World Bank 2006) 
Moving from the analysis of economic and political characteristics to those related to geographic location, it 
can be noticed that tax havens are generally islands, the result being economic openness. Also, tax havens are 
countries with relatively small area (see Table 2). Thus, the average surface in square kilometers is much lower 
for tax havens compared to the other countries (Dharmapala 2008).  
Tax havens are in large proportion former British colonies. Former British colonies’ legislative system is 
more permissive than elsewhere, being based on the British “common law”. Havens are also more likely to use 
English as official language and to be rather dependent territories than sovereign states (Dharmapala 2008). We 
build the follow regression for testing the assumption: 
Tax_haven_status =c0+c1( ln_gdpcap_ppp)+ c2 (ln_population_2011)+ c3 (governance_index) 
+ c4 (tax_rate_offshore_comp)+ c5 (perc_of_services_in_gdp)+ c6 (ln_area_sq_km)+ c7 
(island)+ c8 (english_off_language)+ c9 ( former_british_colony) (1) 
As anticipated, the variables which have a negative impact on a country’s likelihood of becoming a tax 
haven are: the number of inhabitants, the tax rate for offshore companies, the area and governance index. 
According to our findings, the larger a country’s surface (in square km), the lower will its probability of 
becoming a tax haven be. On the contrary, Desai et al. (2006) show that firms are likely to be better able to 
relocate profits to larger tax havens, where their activity is more substantial and leads to higher profit taxes 
paid, which in turn reduces authorities’ suspicions. 
Based on the results from probit model we can synthesize the main results in the next table: 
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Table 3. Coefficients and probabilities for regressions 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TAX_HAVEN_STATUS 
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Independent variable (1) (2) 
Constant -0.53 
(2.90) 
- 
(3.95) 
LN_GDPCAP_PPP  
(-3.95) 
0.83** 
(0.39) 
LN_POPULATION_2011 -0.45*** 
(0.09) 
-0.31* 
(0.18) 
GOVERNANCE_INDEX -0.09 
(0.36) 
- 
 
TAX_RATE_OFFSHORE_COMP -5.55*** 
 
- 
(2.61) 
PERC_OF_SERVICES_IN_GDP  
(2.86) 
LN_AREA_SQ_KM - 
(0.14) 
ISLAND 0.52 
(0.41) 
0.21 
(0.52) 
ENGLISH_OFF_LANGUAGE 0.038** 
(2.21) 
 
 
FORMER_BRITISH_COLONY  
(0.39) 
0.59 
 
Observations 203 201 
McFadden R-squared 0.63  
As it can be noticed from Table 4, the most representative variable for the model according to the value of 
its coefficient and its probability is the percentage of services in GDP and the tax rate for offshore companies.  
Why is the share of services in GDP so restrictive in deciding which countries become tax havens? A 
possible explanation might be that countries that do not have abundant natural resources for industry nor 
favorable conditions for large-scale agricultural production, must find alternatives for generating budget 
revenues, and one of these alternatives is exactly the development of the services sector. The Cayman Islands 
are a good example: besides palm trees and sandy beaches that foster tourism, the country has no other natural 
resources. The same situation is in Switzerland, which besides wood has no other commercially significant 
resource, and where mountains make-up roughly 100% of the country, hence rendering industry and agriculture 
unsustainable. It comes as no surprise that these countries sought alternatives to industry and agriculture and 
developed the extensive network of services, as it is known today. 
3. Conclusions
By applying the model to all countries and analyzing the results, we may conclude that for being a tax haven
a low level of tax rates is not enough. As shown by the probabilities of the coefficients, the most significant 
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variable in the model is not the tax rate for offshore companies, but the percentage of services in GDP. Another 
important conclusion is that only the countries with a relatively small population and high GDP/capita can 
become tax havens. 
Comparing the results of our work with those of the previous, the most important differences concern the 
variables that are significant for the tax haven status is in the case of governance index without significance in 
our model comparative with Dharmapala and Hines (2006) that identified the governance index as being the 
most significant factor.  
Also important determinants are GDP/capita, the number of inhabitants and the fact of being island or not. 
The percentage of services in GDP proved to be very important because tax havens are at the same time 
offshore financial centers and therefore financial services should account for a large percentage in a haven’s 
GDP. The corporate tax rate for offshore companies is another important factor because this is one of the 
primary reasons why many companies are registered in tax havens - to avoid high domestic tax rates. 
Countries with a high population cannot afford to become tax havens because they cannot afford to lose tax 
revenue, and this is why population is also a significant variable and it is proved by the fact that all the 
jurisdictions that are known as tax havens are sparsely populated. GDP/capita captures the welfare of a 
country’s citizens, and poor countries with low values of this indicator cannot become tax havens for the same 
reason as countries with a large population: because they need to collect tax revenue. The fact of being island is 
an important determinant because in general islands have a small number of inhabitants, variable that we also 
identified as being statistically significant for the tax haven status. 
We have to mention that at international level there is an intensified fight against tax havens and this fight is 
coordinated by OECD and European Union. Despite of all these efforts for limiting the tax havens expansion 
our prediction is that tax haven status will be in a continuously development in the future of mainly based on 
financial techniques becoming more sophisticated. 
Appendix A. List of tax havens, prepared by the International Monetary Fund (2008) 
Country/jurisdiction Country/jurisdiction 
1. Andorra 25. Luxembourg 
2. Anguilla 26. Macau S.A.R. 
3. Antigua and Barbuda  Malaysia (Labuan) 
4. Aruba 28. Malta 
5. Bahamas 29. Marshall Islands 
6. Bahrain 30. Mauritius 
 Barbados 31. Monaco 
8. Belize 32. Montserrat
9. Bermuda 33. Nauru 
10. British Virgin Islands 34. Netherlands Antilles
11. Cayman Islands 35. Niue 
12. Cook Islands 36. Palau 
13. Costa Rica  Panama 
14. Cyprus 38. Saint Kitts and Nevis 
15. Dominica 39. Saint Lucia 
16. Gibraltar 40. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
 Grenada 41. Samoa 
18. Guernsey 42. Seychelles
19. Hong Kong 43. Singapore 
20. Ireland 44. Switzerland 
21. Isle of Man 45. Turks and Caicos Islands 
22. Jersey 46. Vanuatu 
23. Lebanon 
24. Liechtenstein 
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